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Aim: In this study, we examine the changes in default risk of the bidder over the course of a merger or 
acquisition. The data set consists of 531 deals in which the acquirers are European firms. We employ a 
general set of determinants to analyse the change in default risk and extend the literature by providing 
new empirical evidence for the European capital market. 
 
Research design: Abnormal returns are analysed to provide preliminary insights into the merger 
induced valuation effects. All hypothesized relationships on the changes in default risk are tested via a 
regression analyses. We differentiate these results further by analysing which factors determine the 
increase in default risk.  
 
Findings: Previous research on this issue reported mixed results. The main finding of our empirical 
analysis is that, on average, mergers and acquisitions of European bidders significantly increase default 
risk during the post-merger period.  
 
Originality: This study adds to the mergers and acquisitions literature for European bidders and 
targets. The empirical findings suggest that some observed relationships and determinants are different 
in Europe than in the United States. 
 
Implications: This research introduces a default risk model that could be applied to predict bidder 
performance subsequent to a merger or acquisition by analysing possible changes in default risk of the 
bidder. It also provides some possible explanations for the average increase in default risk. This study 
may help practitioners to better assess the potential risks when acquiring other firms. 
 
Key words: mergers & acquisitions, abnormal returns, default risk, Europe 
JEL: G32, G34 
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1. Introduction  
 
The total deal value of global mergers and acquisitions (M&As) is at its highest 
level since 2015 and the average deal value has been increasing since the global 
financial crisis of 2008 (Bureau van Dijk 2018). Mergers and acquisitions have 
advanced to become one of the most important growth strategy in many industries 
and for many firms, small and large, resulting in less firms being publicly listed 
(Lattanzio et al. 2019). Nevertheless, merging with or acquiring other firms has 
always been risky as the outcome can either be value creating or value destroying 
for the shareholder of the bidder, and it is not that obvious in advance which 
outcome will occur. Therefore, the objective of this study is to examine the effects 
that a corporate merger or acquisition has on the default probability of the acquirer. 
Previous academic studies combining the research on default risk and M&As is 
rather limited and provides at best ambiguous results. As usual, most M&A research 
primarily focusses on the United States and there is a lack of research for other 
regions. Consequently, our study focusses on Europe. The outcome of this research 
might be of interest to managers of bidder and target firms, investors and corporate 
finance advisors alike, as a firm’s change in default risk after acquiring another firm 
is clearly of essential importance.  
Default or bankruptcy of a firm is defined in legal terms as the moment the firm 
can no longer pay its debt. In technical terms, this is the case when the liabilities 
become larger than the assets of a firm, resulting in negative equity. There are a 
number of different approaches to estimate and predict the default probability of a 
firm. The Merton distance to default model (Merton 1974), an adaptation of the 
Black and Scholes (1973) option pricing model, is an approach to estimate the 
default risk. The distance to default is a measure for how far away a firm is from 
defaulting on its liabilities, making it inversely related to default risk. The Merton 
model assumes efficient financial markets, which is a reasonable assumption for our 
European capital markets and our study. We first apply the Merton model and use 
the Altman Z’’-score (Altman et al. 2014) as a robustness check.  
In our analysis, we first examine for a European data set the valuation effects of 
bidders and targets involved in an acquisition for the period surrounding the 
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announcement and then analyse the determinants explaining these effects. This leads 
to the main research focus of this article, the analysis how a merger and acquisition 
affect the default risk of the bidder after deal completion. Previous research on this 
topic has provided mixed outcomes on both separate samples and partially 
overlapping ones (Koerniadi et al. 2015; Maksimovna 2015). This ambiguity can be 
due to multiple reasons, for example, restrictions on the sample size and sample 
period of these studies.  
The aim of this research is to employ a general set of determinants including 
some sample requirements to extend the research on this topic and to provide new 
findings for the European capital market. The research involves a sample of 531 
deals by European acquiring firms that were completed between October 1998 and 
March 2018. We find support for the idea that distance to default is significantly 
related to the size of the valuation effects. Moreover, we create a uniform model that 
provides empirical evidence for a significant influence of a number of determinants 
on the acquirer’s default risk subsequent to a merger or acquisition. For this, we 
employ various analyses for the full sample and for various subsamples. Overall, 
this research adds new insights to the previous literature and to specific topics such 
as the firm’s distance to default, market valuations, and relative size.  
This article continues as follows. First, we provide a review of the literature on 
mergers and acquisitions. The methodology section outlines our research strategy 
followed by the data and our descriptive statistics. Subsequently, we discuss the 
results in terms of both valuation effects and change in default risk. Finally, we offer 
concluding remarks including the summary of the research and implications for 
practice as well as future research. 
 
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
 
In this section, we discuss the previous literature on the relationship between 
mergers and acquisitions and the financial valuation effects of the bidder and target 
firms. Our focus is especially on the relationship between M&As and changes in 
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default risk. Both of these topics are discussed along several major features, 
resulting in eight hypotheses. 
M&As and valuation effects. Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) suggest that for 
their sample of U.S. public takeovers between 1985 and 2002, the valuation effects 
in terms of cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement period (-1 
day and +1 day) are on average substantial and significantly positive for the 
acquired firm (target).
1
 Alexandridis et al. (2010) study firms across the globe. They 
provide evidence for both a world-wide and a European subsample that target firms 
experience positive and highly significant abnormal returns during the period 
surrounding the M&A announcement. Ishii and Xuan (2014) also find for a strictly 
US sample positive valuation effects for the target in the period surrounding the 
announcement. Tang and Xu (2016) report positive and significant abnormal returns 
for the target in the 5 days after the announcement date for their sample of mostly 
US deals. An explanation for these observations is that, on average, the acquirer has 
to pay a substantial premium for buying the shares of the target (Savor, Lu 2009). If 
markets are efficient, meaning that all M&A related information is incorporated 
instantaneously and fully in the stock price, then there should be hardly any stock 
price reaction of the target before and after the announcement but only on the day 
when the deal becomes public knowledge. The size of the premium and the stock 
price reaction could depend on a number of factors, which we will explore later on. 
Often, the size of this premium is based on possible synergy gains and most to 
nearly all synergy gains go to the target shareholders, resulting in positive valuation 
effects (Bessler, Schneck 2015, 2016). The finding that the target company’s 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is positive and significant is also in line with the 
previous literature (Mitchell et al. 2001). The above-described findings and those 
from the literature are shown in Table 1 leading to the formulation of our first 
hypothesis. 
                                                 
1
 In this context, a valuation effect is an information induced change of a share price of a 
listed company. Abnormal returns are the risk adjusted percentage share price change minus 
the percentage price change of the overall market (Brown and Warner, 1985). Cumulative 
abnormal returns refer to the sum of abnormal returns. The calculation of this measure is 
explained in more detail in the methodology section. 
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H1: In the period surrounding the announcement of an M&A deal, there are positive 
valuation effects and positive abnormal returns for the target, meaning that the share 
price of the bidder increases by more than the appropriate benchmark. 
The hypothesized relationship might be influenced by a number of variables, 
including the relative size between the acquiring firm and the target firm (Cornett et 
al. 2011). Moeller et al. (2004) first provide support for a size effect on the valuation 
outcomes in M&As. Arık and Kutan (2015) suggest that the relative size does 
indeed have a significant positive impact on the share price of the target. In these 
cases, the target is relatively smaller compared to the acquirer. There is, on average, 
a higher premium when the relative size of the acquirer increases, as the size of the 
premium becomes less relevant for the acquirer. 
There could be another economic intuition for explaining this relationship when 
the relative sizes change. For cases where the target is relatively larger than the 
bidder, the integration into the smaller bidder may require more diligent integration 
work within the acquiring firm (Antoniou et al. 2008). There is empirical evidence 
that this relative size effects may only become relevant over time but they are 
reflected in the target returns surrounding the M&A announcement (Kiymaz, Baker 
2008). In Table 1, we summarize the findings of various studies on this effect. 
Consequently, we formulate the second hypothesis as follows:  
H2: When the target is relatively smaller than the acquiring firm, its share price 
increase will be relatively higher in the period surrounding the announcement of an 
M&A deal than for larger targets. 
Another firm characteristic that may influence the size of the valuation effect 
during a merger or acquisition is Tobin’s q, defined as a ratio between the market 
value of a firm’s assets and the replacement value of the firm’s assets (Tobin 1969). 
The Tobin’s q can also be seen as a forward-looking proxy for how ‘well’ a firm is 
managed (Dezsö, Ross 2012). This means that a ‘better’ managed firm more 
effectively creates cash flows from its assets and therefore increases its market value 
(cf. Lang et al. 1989). In some of the previous literature, this measure is extended to 
relative Tobin’s q (Alexandridis et al. 2012). A higher value of this measure 
indicates that the acquiring firm is ‘better’ managed and creates cash flows more 
efficiently than the target. Intuitively, this suggests that if the acquiring firm has 
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superior management quality and is better managed than the target firm is, the latter 
would benefit from this superior management capacity and skills when the firms are 
combined through an M&A. This could be interpreted as one form of synergies, 
resulting in a higher premium and a higher valuation effect of the target’s shares. 
Dong et al. (2006) indicate that the relative market-to-book ratios of the acquirer 
and the target may also influence the size of the premium and therefore the abnormal 
target returns. As before, there should be a positive relationship (Alexandridis et al. 
2012) as possible synergies are expected to materialize when the bidder begins to 
manage the targets’ assets. For example, when the acquiring firm is expected to 
create cash flows more efficiently than the target firm, given its asset base, the deal 
will create an immediate value gain for the shareholders of the target firm as the 
share price increases before the deal is completed (Wang, Xie 2008). In Table 1, we 
provide some additional results of the relationship between Tobin’s q and the 
abnormal returns. In a number of previous studies, separate variables were used for 
Tobin’s q, however, not the ratio we use in this study. Therefore, we report the 
results of all different ratios. The insights from the previous literature lead to the 
formulation of the third hypothesis. 
H3: The target’s share price will increase relatively more in the period 
surrounding the announcement of an M&A deal when the Tobin’s q of the target is 
relatively lower than the Tobin’s q of the acquiring firm and vice versa. 
M&As and default risk. As an exploratory step, it is interesting to understand 
whether the default risk of one or both firms involved in a deal have any influence 
on the magnitude of the valuation effects. It is important to note that many variables 
affect the direction and size of the effect. One important variable is the method of 
payment used for a merger or acquisition as it influences the financial risk of the 
bidder. The alternatives are either paying with shares or cash or a combination of 
both. In a share deal, some risk is transferred from the bidder to the target 
shareholders. In a cash deal, the safe assets “cash” is exchanged for riskier assets or 
future cash flows of the target, hence, having bidder shareholders sharing in the full 
risk of the post-merger firm (Furfine, Rosen 2011). Financing of the deal can occur 
with either equity, debt or the firm’s cash holdings. When financing the deal by 
issuing corporate bonds, there also occurs some kind of risk transfer between the 
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shareholders of the target and the acquirer (Billett et al. 2004). Overall, according to 
Bessler et al. (2011), it is important to analyse the deal by differentiating with 
respect to leverage and changes in leverage of the bidder, the employed financing 
instruments (cash, debt, or equity) as well as the method of payment (cash and 
shares). These are all important variables for analysing the bidders’ post-merger 
change in default risk. 
We now review and discuss the literature with respect to merger-induced 
changes in default risk. In our empirical analysis, we implement the Merton distance 
to default model as our main measure for default risk and changes in default risk. 
The distance to default is defined as how many standard deviations a firm is away 
from defaulting on its liabilities when concentrating on the distribution of the total 
asset values. Distance to default and default risk must be negatively correlated: the 
higher the distance to default, the lower is the default risk. So far, the literature using 
structural default risk models for analysing the changes in default risk from before to 
subsequent of a merger or acquisition is limited. The outcomes of the few studies so 
far are summarized in Table 2. Therefore, this research widens the scope of the 
M&A literature on this topic although it is to some extent exploratory.  
This research adds some new insights to the literature by focussing on European 
acquirers as well as on specific aspects, especially default risk. The basic idea is that 
mergers or acquisitions affect and change the default risk of the acquiring firm 
(Bruyland, De Maeseneire 2016), depending on the success of the firm subsequent 
to the acquisition. There are different reasons and explanations why the firm’s 
default risk may decrease or increase or may be unaffected by the M&A. Furfine 
and Rosen (2011) explain the negative effect with the observation that often the 
firms’ leverage increases post-merger (Ghosh, Jain 2000), and most likely, a higher 
firm leverage increases the default risk. Even in the case when Furfine and Rosen 
(2011) control for the effect of leverage increases, they still find an increase in 
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Another starting point to analyse this increase in default risk, at least on average, 
is based on the idea to implement Merton’s distance to default model that 
incorporates all consequences of equity mispricing (Liao et al. 2009). It is based on 
the notion that the agency problem of free cash flow (Jensen 1986) has a direct 
impact on how to judge the default risk of a firm (Maksimovna 2015). If managers 
have a free cash flow surplus, they will often make poor investments and suboptimal 
merger and acquisition decisions and consequently are not acting in the best interest 
of shareholders (Jensen 2005). In a preliminary study, Pelov and Nguyen (2018) aim 
to explain why some form of risk transfer occurs in a corporate environment. Billett 
et al. (2004) had already studied this issue for corporate bond issuances related to 
M&As before. Similar results are also captured by Bruyland and De Maeseneire 
(2016). Therefore, we use and generalize these results for our research. Based on the 
previous studies and their empirical findings, we formulate our fourth hypothesis as 
follows. 
H4: Mergers and acquisitions, on average, will increase the acquiring firm’s 
default risk, implying a negative relationship with the change in distance to default. 
One of the explanations for this increase in bidder’s default risk is that the target 
has a higher default risk and it occurs some kind of risk transfer when the target firm 
is merged with or acquired by the bidder. In this case, synergies and diversification 
effects may be less positive and in some cases may turn out to be negative. Prior 
research has already provided some support for this risk transfer by studying the 
response of corporate bond prices to an M&A announcement. Results from Kedia 
and Zhou (2014) suggest that the target’s bond price increased when the acquiring 
firm’s bonds were higher rated than the bonds of the target company at the time of 
an acquisition. In this case, the yield required by bondholders after the M&A is 
lower due to the higher quality of the bidder. These results are somewhat similar to 
those provided Billett et al. (2004). 
There is also some kind of equity risk transfer in an M&A process. For a US 
M&A sample, there is some evidence that the default risk increases more when the 
target is not in distress than when it is in distress (Bruyland, De Maeseneire 2016). 
A duplication of this study with a different sample led to similar results (Pelov, 
Nguyen 2018). Although this seems less sensible at first glance, there are examples 
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that could lead to this outcome. First, when the cash flows of bidder and target are 
negatively correlated, resulting in lower risk when they are combined, resulting in a 
higher valuation. Second, when the target is in distress and the assets are extremely 
low valued, the acquisition could be a project with a positive net present value. 
Therefore, from a risk management perspective, it seems in some instances 
beneficial for the acquiring firm to acquire or merge with a distressed target. 
Therefore, for some deals the premium paid for such a target could be lower than 
that of a non-distressed target, resulting in a lower payment and possible lower 
increase in leverage but higher gains. The fifth hypothesis is therefore formulated as 
follows. 
H5: In specific circumstances, there will be a larger increase in default risk of 
the bidder when the target is less risky and vice versa, implying a negative 
relationship with change in distance to default. 
An additional aspect is that most research usually finds different outcomes 
between cross-border and domestic mergers (cf. Maksimovna 2015). Cross-border 
M&A deals could contribute to the diversification of risk (Amihud, Lev 1981) and 
this should result in a decrease in default risk. This reasoning may explain the 
difference in the results of Furfine and Rosen (2011) and Koerniadi et al. (2015). 
The first study uses only US domestic M&A’s and finds, on average, an increase in 
default risk. The second study focusses only on US cross-border deals and provides 
evidence for an average decrease in default risk. In addition, when a new host 
country is more distand than a host country that is on the same continent, this might 
result in higher diversification opportunities. Consequently, the above reasoning 
leads to the following hypothesis. 
H6: Change in distance to default of the acquirer will be positively related to 
geographical diversification, implying that there might be a decrease in default risk 
when the deal is cross-border and/or cross-continent and vice versa. 
Another possible explanation for an increase in default risk, which we already 
indicated above, is the increase of post-merger leverage (Ghosh, Jain 2000). 
Whether this occurs or not depends on the financing of the deal and the method of 
payment that the acquirer employs. It is widely established that there are differences 
in valuation effects between different financing and payment methods, due to 
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different information asymmetries (Bessler et al. 2011). When an M&A is paid for 
in cash, it is possible that the deal is financed by issuing additional debt (bonds), and 
therefore leverage and risk could increase (Furfine, Rosen 2011). However, it is also 
possible that for a cash deal the bidder either has accumulated cash or issued new 
equity before the deal announcement (Bessler et al. 2011). Nevertheless, agency 
problems imply that bidders pay with cash when a positive deal outcome is highly 
likely and with shares when the deal outcome is much riskier, sharing risk and 
possible losses with the target shareholders. Consequently, this also suggests that 
share deals are more likely to increase the bidders’ default risk.  
In contrast, another aspect is that since the acquirer is exchanging the safer 
liquid assets “cash” for the riskier future cash flows of the target company, default 
risk might increase (Furfine, Rosen 2011), especially when the deal outcome is 
risky. This relationship is supported by Koerniadi et al. (2015). In contrast, when the 
target is acquired by paying with shares (the bidder issues shares and transfers them 
to the target’s shareholders for exchange of the target shares), there is usually no 
increase in leverage, but a decrease. Consequently, when paying with shares, the 
leverage of the firm is seldom increased, but often the equity is increased and 
leverage is decreased, unless a high level of debt is assumed from the target or the 
bidder had increased leverage during the period before and now uses the equity 
issuing for the deal to adjust back to its optimal capital structure. Importantly, a 
steep increase in cash as a method of payment for M&As was observed for various 
reasons during the last decade. We tend to follow the agency problem argument and 
state our hypothesis seven as follows. 
H7: When in M&As the target shareholders are at least partially paid for with 
shares, there will be a larger increase in default risk than with cash payments, 
indicating a negative relationship for share deals with change in distance to default 
and a positive relationship for cash deals. 
As already discussed, the relative firm size in a deal might affect the size of the 
valuation effect of a target firm (Asquith et al. 1983). In Table 2, a number of 
outcomes for this relationship are summarized. It seems that a positive relationship 
is supported, meaning that when the acquirer is relatively larger than the target, the 
increase of the default risk will be relatively smaller. Acquiring a smaller target 
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might lead to a less complicated integration process then when buying a larger target 
(Antoniou et al. 2008). This results in the eighth and last hypothesis. 
H8: In M&A’s there will be larger increase in default risk when the target is 
relatively larger and vice versa, indicating a negative relationship with change in 





In this section, we introduce the methodology for measuring abnormal returns as 
well as the Merton’s distance to default model and explain how we integrate these 
measures into our research. First, we analyse the valuation effects surrounding an 
M&A announcement and then the distance to default. For this analysis, a number of 
variables are required, which we define and provide in Table 3.  
The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of the target are calculated over a 3-
day time window (Mitchell et al. 2001). This time frame was chosen, as it should 
capture the entire valuation effects when the markets are efficient. Longer periods 
could cause biased results as more but different information may become available 
(Brown, Warner 1985). The calculations are performed as follows.  
 ( 1 ) 
with, 
  ( 2 ) 
where Ri,t is the stock return for each company included in the sample for the 
40-day period surrounding the M&A announcement, E(Ri,t) is the expected return 
for the stock that is calculated in equation 2, using the βit that is a measure for stock 
price volatility. MRt is the return of the market in which the stock is traded and 
CARi is the cumulative abnormal return over the 40-day period. 
Alternatively, we want to analyse whether some valuation effects occurred 
already before the official announcement of an M&A and whether more M&A 
relevant information become public later on. For this, we concentrate on a longer 
period surrounding the event. The buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are 
calculated, for the 20-day period surrounding the deal, as below. 
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  ( 3 )  
with, 
     ( 4 ) 
 
ARi,t is the abnormal return for any company i at day t in the time period 
examined and BHARi is the buy and hold abnormal return for all specific company 
stocks in the sample. This is the return that an investor would have obtained above 
the market return when keeping the stock in a portfolio for a period t, in this case 20 
days surrounding the M&A announcement. The default risk of the bidder and target 
firm was calculated from the 260 days preceding the announcement until the 260 
days after the completion, similar to what previous studies did. For this, we employ 
Merton’s distance to default (DD) model, which is an extension of the Black and 
Scholes (1973) option pricing model. We adopt the Merton DD model as described 
by Bharath and Shumway (2008). The formulas and data needed for our calculations 
are available in the Appendix.  
For our hypotheses on the valuation effects, we create different subsamples from 
the overall sample. We also analyse the average CAR of the various samples, by 
running a two-sample t-test with equal variances. We test whether the hypothesized 
influences of the determinants are observable in the data. Afterwards we test all 
hypothesized relationships via regression analyses. The regression analyses include 
a number of control variables that are commonly used (cf. Maksimovna 2015), for 
example, the natural logarithm of the deal value, the stake that the acquiring 
company already owned in the target, the number of days the deal has taken for 
completion, and the profitability margin of both companies. Intuitive relationships 
between these control variables and the dependent variables are given in the results 
section.  
Equation 5 depicts the regression used to analyse all hypothesized relationships. 
 ( 5 ) 
where S is a measure for the relative size of the acquiring company versus the target 
company, calculated by dividing the market capitalization of both companies at the 
announcement date. It is used to test the second hypothesis. Also, q is a measure for 
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the acquirer versus target relative Tobin’s q. It is used to test the third hypothesis. 
DDacq and DDtar are the distance to default of the acquirer and target respectively. 
 
Table 3. Data needs for further analysis 
 Variable Explanation Database (source) 
40-day period stock 
returns 
R 
Surrounding the announcement, 
for acquirer and target 
Thomson Reuters 
DataStream 
Stock beta Β For acquirer and target. 
Thomson Reuters 
DataStream 
40-day market return MR Surrounding the announcement 
Thomson Reuters 
DataStream 
Market Capitalization V Daily on close 
Thomson Reuters 
DataStream 
Total Liabilities K Quarterly 
Thomson Reuters 
DataStream 





Risk-free rate R Daily on close Investing.com 
Relative Tobin’s q Q 
Tobin’s q acquirer / Tobin’s q 
target, both at announcement. 
Thomson Reuters 
DataStream 
Relative Size S 
Market cap acquirer / market cap 





Pc & Ps 
(Partially used) payment methods, 
dummy variables are included for 
cash and shares 
Zephyr by BvD 
Country diversification CD 
Dummy, 1 = cross-country & 0 = 
domestic 




Dummy, 1 = cross-continent & 0 = 
same continent 
Zephyr by BvD 
Profit margin πi 








The amount of days between the 
announcement and the completion 
of the deal. 
Zephyr by BvD 
Deal value DV 
Natural logarithm of the deal value 
in euros 
Zephyr by BvD 
Initial Stake (%) IS - Zephyr by BvD 
Acquired Stake (%) AS - Zephyr by BvD 
    
Note 1: for all variables if there is no timespan specified, for the acquiring firm the following 
periods will be collected: 260-day pre-announcement, between announcement and completion and 
260-day post-completion. For the target firm all variables are gathered for the periods preceding 
the announcement and up until the completion.  
Note 2: for the risk-free rate, the 30-year German government bond yield is used, as it is the most 
widely used in practice and literature on European cases. 
Note 3: Tobin’s q is calculated by dividing the market value of equity and the book value of equity 
Kaldor 1966). 
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For the default risk, we also analyse a number of subsamples based on the 
different dummy variables and other hypothesized relationships. These are examined 
in the same way as was discussed above and the results are available upon request. 
We run an overall regression, for which the hypothesized relations are depicted in 
the equation below. 
 ( 6 ) 
ΔIADDacq is the change in industry-adjusted distance to default of the acquiring 
company between before the announcement and after the completion of the deal. It 
is industry-adjusted by taking the average change in distance to default of each 
industry and calculating the difference from that for each acquiring firm. This is 
done to account for inter-industry and time effects. DDtar is the distance to default of 
the target company. CD is a dummy variable for country diversification, with a 
value of 1 when the target is from a different country than the acquirer and CoD is a 
dummy variable for continent diversification, with a value of 1 when the target is 
form a different continent than the acquirer. Both of the variables are used to test the 
sixth hypothesis. Pc and Ps are dummy variables used to test for the seventh 
hypothesis, they are variables that are assigned a value of 1 when cash or shares 
respectively are at least partially used by the acquirer to pay for the target company.  
 
 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
In this section, we present the sample and explain the restrictions imposed on it. 
We also provide additional insights into the data by portraying the descriptive 
statistics. Furthermore, we discuss some of the subsamples to study size and Tobin’s 
q effects in more depth. The sample is gathered by hand and comprises of deals that 
were completed between the 1
st
 of October 1998 and the 5
th
 of March 2018. The end 
date is chosen to ensure that there are at least 260 trading days subsequent to the 
completion of the last deal and the time of the analysis. This is also important for the 
analysis of the distance to default in the next section. 
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There are multiple restrictions for constructing the sample. First of all, banks 
and utilities are excluded (Furfine, Rosen 2011) as well as all deals with a value 
below €1 million (Moeller et al. 2005) to include only deals that have a significant 
economic impact (Maksimovna 2015). Only M&A’s are included in the sample, 
which means that LBO’s and private equity deals are excluded. The pre-merger 
ownership must be below 50% and the post-merger ownership of the target by the 
bidder must exceeds 50% (Furfine, Rosen 2011). Because of our focus on Europe, a 
requirement is that an acquiring firm’s home country has to belong to the enlarged 
European Union of 28 countries. Our requirements lead to a sample size of 1,050 
deals, which details have been obtained via Zephyr by Bureau van Dijk (BvD). The 
data, however, had to be thoroughly cleaned by hand because of missing data on key 
variables. This resulted in a final sample size of 531 M&As. The cleaning procedure 
is available upon request. The distance to default, profit margin, and the CAR are 
winsorized on the 1% and 99% level, to account for extreme values and outliers in 
these variables. Our robustness test suggests that this practice does not significantly 
influence the results.  
In Table 4, we provide the geographic locations of all firms. There are a number 
of countries that have a rather low number of acquiring firms over the sample 
period. As an unpublished robustness test available from the authors upon request, 
the deals were excluded in which the acquiring firm was from a small deal country 
with fewer than 10 deals over the sample period. The results do not change 
significantly when leaving these deals out of the sample though. The spread of 
country and continent diversification deals can also be found in Table 4.  
In Table 5, we present the number of deals per year. From this table no real 
pattern can be observed. There is a higher number of deals in the years prior to the 
2008/2009 Global Financial Crisis, which might be due to the positive growth 
expectations during these years. Furthermore, it needs to be noted that the sample is 
unevenly spread over the countries. In an unpublished test that is available upon 
request, we find indications that this does not have a material impact on our results. 
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country   
Industry 
  
Austria 3 5 
Chemicals, rubber, plastics, non-
metallics 68 66 
Belgium 14 9 Construction 32 32 
Denmark 9 5 Education, Health 3 3 
Finland 16 13 Food, Beverages, tobacco 31 31 
France 88 63 Hotels & Restaurants 18 18 
Germany 50 38 
Machinery & Equipment, 
furniture, recycling 82 81 
Great-Britain 170 127 Metals & metal products 28 28 
Greece 11 16 Post and Telecommunication 43 43 
Ireland 21 5 
Primary sector (agriculture, 
mining, etc.) 14 14 
Italy 23 10 Publishing, print 9 9 
Luxembourg 8 2 
Textiles, wearing apparel, 
leather 5 5 
Malta 1 1 Transport 7 7 
Netherlands 38 15 Wholesale & retail trade 37 37 
Poland 12 15 Wood, cork, paper 7 7 
Portugal 2 5 Other services 147 150 
Spain 26 16 Total 531 531 
Sweden 39 19 
   Other-Europe 0 32 Geographical diversification 
  North-
America 
0 95 Domestic 
249 
 SCA 0 14 Cross-border 282 
 Asia 0 12 Total 531 
 Africa 0 9 
   Oceania 0 4 Europe 396 
 Other 0 1 Cross-continent 135 
 Total 531 531 Total 531 
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Table 5. Number of deals per year 
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Table 6 shows the descriptive statistics of our study. In Table 7 we present the 
correlation matrix. Overall, most Pearson correlation coefficients are close to zero. 
The correlation between the distance to default of the acquirer and the industry-
adjusted change in distance to default is ρ=-0.356. When the first variable rises by 
1%, the second one decreases by 0.356%. Acquiring firms with higher distance to 
default before the deal experience a decrease in their distance to default during the 
merger process. The correlation between initial stake and acquired stake is very low 
(ρ=-0.918), but only the first is chosen as a control variable. The correlation between 
share payments and cross-country deals is also remarkable (ρ=-0.394). Cross-
country deals are less often paid with shares. Acquirers are less prone to exchange 
shares with a foreign target in an M&A deal, or more likely, the shareholders of the 
foreign targets are much less interested in receiving shares of the bidder as the 
monitoring and transaction cost for these shares could be relatively high later on. 
 
Figure 1. The buy and hold abnormal return around the announcement 
date
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Figure 1 depicts the development of the average buy and hold abnormal returns 
(BHAR) for the 20-day period surrounding the announcement for the entire sample. 
There is a run-up period before the announcement in the abnormal returns of the 
target of around 6 days. After the third day, the target underperforms the market. 
These observations are confirmed by unpublished but available on request t-tests for 
various CAR intervals (cf. Tang, Xu 2016). A run-up period indicates that markets 
are most likely not perfectly efficient, since apparently some investors have access 
to privileged information and trade on these beforehand. Underperformance 
afterwards is not standard and could be caused by sampling of unsuccessful deals 
(Schwert 1996), which is not the case here. Another reason might be that an M&A 
deal is overpriced surrounding the announcement. This would lead to the market 
compensating this error later on.  
 











17.598 > < 0.0002%  AAA Investment Grade 357 352 
17.598 -> 8.696 
0.0002% -> 
0.0016% 
AA -> BBB+ Investment grade 78 54 
8.696 -> 1.316 0.0016% -> 13.99% BBB -> B- High Yield 32 29 
< 1.316 14% > < C High Yield 64 96 
   Total 531 531 
      
Note 1: PD is calculated using a 3 degrees of freedom t-distribution (Furfine, Rosen 2011). 
Note 2: Investment grade bonds have low default risks, high yield bonds have high default risks. 
 
In Table 8, we present the distribution of the distance to default of the acquirer 
and the target. For the preliminary analysis, the subsample on financial performance 
is based on whether the corporate bond of the acquirer or target is investment grade 
(IG) or high yield (HY). The rating is determined based on the distance to default as 
calculated via the Merton (1974) model. In the overall regression analysis, the actual 
distance to default is used. Most sampled firms are AAA rated or lower, and there is 
also a substantial number of firms that are even almost in distress (below C-rated). 
They will be analysed as well. 
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Table 9. Distribution of leverage ratio 





















     























    
          
Note: All of the portrayed variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 
Results in Table 9 indicate that the high-yield firms have, on average, a higher 
leverage level, measured via a liabilities-to-equity ratio. This is as expected, since a 
higher leverage level means a higher face value of debt and thus a smaller distance 
to default and higher default risk. In table 10, we present the descriptive statistics on 
the different payment methods used in the analysis. These dummy variables refer to 
a payment method when is at least partially used. 
 
Table 10. Distribution of partially used payment methods 
Payment method (Partially) used Not used Total 
Cash 385 101 486 
Shares 269 217 486 
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
In this section, we present the results of our empirical analyses and evaluate the 
validity of our hypotheses. The first part focusses on the data set by examining the 
valuation effects for the shareholders of the target firm. Afterwards, we concentrate 
on the main objective of this article by analysing the change in default risk before 
and subsequent to the merger.  
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M&As and valuation effects 
The results in Table 11 reveal that the cumulative abnormal return of the 
acquirer is on average 0.094% in the 3-day window around the M&A 
announcement. A two-sided t-test, however, indicates that this difference is not 
significant (p=0.615) different from zero, suggesting that there is no immediate 
benefit for the acquirer’s shareholders. In contrast, the results for the target firm’s 
shareholders do reveal significantly (p=0.000) positive cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR=11.716%) around the announcement day, which supports our first hypothesis. 
This means that the target’s shareholders of our sample firms fully demand and 
obtain the expected synergy gains as a premium for agreeing to the acquisition or for 
tendering their shares. Bidder shareholder could only benefit in the future from the 
unexpected and not yet valued synergies. This result is consistent with the ones 
previously documented in the literature (Bessler and Schneck, 2015, 2016).  
 
Table 11. Cumulative abnormal returns for the full sample 
 Acquirer Target 
Average of CAR(-1;+1; announcement) (%) 0.094 11.716 
t-statistic 0.504 14.885 
p-value 0.615 0.000 
N 531 531 
   
Note: two-sided independent t-test conducted to test whether on average the CAR is significantly 
different from 0, which is also the reported t-statistic. 
 
In Table 12 we report the findings for our second hypothesis, expecting that the 
relative size and the valuation effects for the target are positively related. When 
relative size is higher than the median, the average CAR of the target is more than 
twice as large ( =15.70%) than when the relative size is below the median of 
4.29 ( =7.75%). The difference is significantly different from zero (p=0.000), 
suggesting that target shareholders experience larger positive valuation effects when 
a relatively larger acquirer buys a smaller target. This initial evidence for the size 
effect as described by Moeller et al. (2004) is hardly surprising. Even when a larger 
firm only pays a marginally higher sum, this results in significantly higher target 
returns. Offering a relatively higher price for smaller targets also prevents other 
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bidders to enter into a competition for the target, which otherwise would make the 
deal much more expensive for the bidder (Bessler et al. 2015).  
 
Table 12. Cumulative abnormal returns for the relative size subsamples 
Relative size ≥ median (4.29) Target 
 Average of CAR(-1;+1; announcement) (%) 15.697 
 t-statistic 11,703 
 p-value 0.000 
 N 265 
  
Relative size < median (4.29)  
 Average of CAR(-1;+1; announcement) (%) 7.750 
 t-statistic 10.273 
 p-value 0.000 
 N 266 
  
Difference in means  
 t-statistics -5.169 
 p-value 0.000 
 N 531 
  
Note: two-sided independent t-test conducted to test whether on average the CAR is 
significantly different from 0, which is also the reported t-statistic. 
 
However, the significant relationship could be influenced by other factors that 
correlate with relative size. Therefore, we test this relationship in a general 
regression model for which we present the findings in Table 14. The results support 
the positive relationship between the relative size and the 20-day buy-and-hold-
abnormal returns (β=0.0002; p=0.016), thus providing further evidence for our 
second hypothesis. In contrast, this result might indicate that when the target is of 
similar size or relatively larger than the bidder, the integration into the acquiring 
firm might require more complicated integration efforts (Antoniou et al. 2008) 
creating less value.  
The exploratory results on the third hypothesis are presented in Table 13. They 
suggest that there is a positive relationship between relative Tobin’s q and the 
valuation effects of the target. According to Wang and Xie (2008), target firms 
would usually benefit from a merger with or acquisition by a relatively ‘better’ 
managed firm. This expectation is also supported by our initial test, which suggests 
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that when the relative Tobin’s q is larger than the median (1.04) the average CAR is 
significantly higher ( =14.26%; =9.16%); p=0.001). This evidence is also 
supported by the overall regression results in Table 13 (β=0.00406; p=0.000). This 
result implies that when the Tobin’s q of the acquiring firm increases by one relative 
to the Tobin’s q of the target, the 20-day buy-and-hold-abnormal return increases by 
0.41%. This suggests that indeed the target shareholders benefit more from merging 
with or being acquired by a more efficiently managed acquirer. When managed 
under the direction of the ‘superior’ acquirer’s management team, the merged firm 
can behave more efficiently and create higher cash flows than before. 
 
Table 13. Cumulative abnormal returns for the relative Tobin’s q subsamples 
Relative Tobin’s q ≥ median (1.04)       Target 
  Average of CAR(-1;+1; announcement) (%) 14.264 
  t-statistic 11.327 
  p-value 0.000 
  N 266 
  
Relative Tobin’s q < median (1.04)  
  Average of CAR(-1;+1; announcement) (%) 9.159 
  t-statistic 9.963 
  p-value 0.000 
  N  
  
Difference in means  
  t-statistics -3.272 
  p-value 0.001 
  N 531 
  
Note: two-sided independent t-test conducted to test whether on average the CAR is 
significantly different from 0, which is also the reported t-statistic. 
 
Next to the evidence that supports the first three hypotheses on valuation effects, 
Table 14 highlights some other interesting and significant results. There is a positive 
and significant relationship between cash as a method of payment and target 
valuation effects (β=0.128; p=0.005). When cash is at least partially used for 
payment, the buy-and-hold-abnormal return are, on average, higher. One 
explanation for this observation is the positive signalling effect resulting from 
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paying with cash (Yook 2003). In this case, the acquiring firm unintentionally 
signals that the target firm is undervalued, at least from their perspective, or that at 
the current offering price the deal is a positive net present investment project. The 
coefficient for the cross-continent dummy is also significant and positive (β=0.118; 
p=0.025). This implies that when the target is non-European, and the acquirer is 
European, the valuation effect of the target is larger, which also means that the 
premium that needs to be or is paid in foreign acquisitions is higher. One possible 
explanation is that in other continents the target shareholders demand a higher 
premium for being acquired by a European firm. It is also possible that the 
synergistic gains are larger, justifying the payment of a higher premium. 
 
Table 14. Results of OLS regressions on the Buy and Hold abnormal return 
 Variables Hypotheses (1) (2) (3) 
Profit margin of Acquirer + -0.13244** -0.11915** -0.07417 
  
(0.05460) (0.05403) (0.05875) 
Profit margin of Target + 0.01567 0.01706 0.02612** 
  
(0.01126) (0.01100) (0.01144) 
     
Payment dummy cash + 0.11074*** 0.11363*** 0.12764*** 
  
(0.04268) (0.04278) (0.04528) 
Payment dummy shares - 0.02193 0.02553 0.02847 
  
(0.05825) (0.05830) (0.05542) 
Cross-country + -0.02485 -0.02407 -0.02307 
  
(0.02396) (0.02403) (0.02395) 
Cross-continent + 0.13695** 0.12755** 0.11745** 
  
(0.05308) (0.05290) (0.05212) 
Days between announcement and 
completion 
? 0.00011 0.00012 0.00019* 
  
(0.00010) (0.00010) (0.00011) 
Log of deal value ? -0.01182* -0.01082* -0.00783 
  
(0.00650) (0.00650) (0.00606) 
Initial stake (%) + -0.05648 -0.04987 -0.03125 
  
(0.07063) (0.07037) (0.07422) 
Relative Size + 
 
0.00001 0.00020** 
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Table 14. Cont. … 
 Variables Hypotheses (1) (2) (3) 
Relative Tobin’s q + 
 
0.00437*** 0.00406*** 
   
(0.00102) (0.00091) 
DD[-130; -5; announcement] acquirer ? 
  
-0.00034 
    
(0.00040) 
DD[-130; -5; announcement] target ? 
  
-0.00086*** 




0.27943*** 0.24454** 0.18836* 
  
(0.10192) (0.09966) (0.09705) 
     
Observations 
 
486 486 486 
Adjusted R-squared 
 
0.06355 0.08192 0.10300 
F-statistic  6.94 7.41 7.52 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1: The dependent variable is the BHAR, which is the Buy and Hold abnormal return of the 20-
day period [-10; +10] surrounding the announcement date. 
Note 2: DD is the distance to default of the respective firm (a higher value on this variable refers to a 
better performing firm). 
Note 3: All variables are either the mean from the period surrounding the announcement date, which 
is shown by the number of business days in the brackets, or at the announcement date. 
 
 
The last result to be discussed is the negative and significant relationship 
between the distance to default of the target and its buy-and-hold-abnormal return 
(β=-0.00086; p=0.001). A riskier target in an M&A deal will generate higher 
abnormal returns (BHAR) for its shareholders. This could be resulting from a 
favourable market reaction because the acquirer is in a way rescuing the target from 
defaulting, but at a very lucrative price at it assumes the default risk. However, the 
target’s default risk may not cause any problems when integrated into the bidder’s 
operations. Another example is that the risk and cash flows af bidder and target are 
negatively correlated, offering some diversification benefits. Along this thinking it is 
also possible that acquiring firms value target firms with a lower distance to default 
relatively higher as the potential gains may exceed the ones from normal deals, and 
they usually are able to bear the risk that might be transferred through the M&A 
transaction. Figuring out the reasoning behind this and how an acquisition or merger 
affects the default risk over the deal process are the main objectives of this study. 
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M&As and default risk 
The cumulative distance to default in the European sample is not normally 
distributed as can be observed in Figure 2a and 2b. A Shapiro-Wilk test for 
normality confirms that the distance to default of both the acquirer and the target is 
non-normal. To obtain the probability of default a t-distribution with 3 degrees of 
freedom is used, following the previous literature (Furfine, Rosen 2011). 
Our conclusion from this analysis is that the average change in distance to 
default is negative and significant (ΔDD =-2,668; p=0.001) and the distance to 
default has a negative relationship with default risk (see also figure 3). The results 
provided in Table 15 indicate that, on average, mergers and acquisitions increase the 
default risk of the bidder or the merged firm. Thus, we find support for our fourth 
hypothesis. The result might be partially due to other effects such an increase in 
leverage when additional debt is issued to finance the deal, or when the target has a 
high leverage before the deal and the bidder assumes the debt and is increasing its 
own leverage. This is often the case in a merger or acquisition (Ghosh, Jain 2000).  
 
Figure 2a. Distance to default of acquiring firms prior to the announcement 
 
Note: This graph was constructed after winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
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Figure 2b. Distance to default of target firms prior to the announcement 
 
 
Note: This graph was constructed after winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
 
Figure 3. Average acquiring firm distance to default, over the deal process 
 
Note 1: This graph was constructed after winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentile. 
Note 2: For the construction of this graph, the average of two periods were taken per firm, the 125 days 
leading up to 5 days before the announcement and the 125-day period 5 days after the completion of 
the deal. From these three averages, the average across the sample was calculated. 
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Table 15. Results of the change in Merton distance to default 
 Acquirer 




Note: two-sided independent t-test conducted to test whether on average the change in 
distance to default is significantly different from 0. 
 
Table 16. OLS regression results for the industry-adjusted change in distance 
to default 
 Variables Hypotheses (1) (2) 
  
   
BHAR[-10; +10; announcement] acquirer ? -7.120 -4.599 
  
(7.925) (8.420) 
BHAR[-10; +10; announcement] target ? -1.208 -3.463 
  
(4.731) (4.830) 
Profit margin of Acquirer + -2.349 12.877** 
  
(5.311) (5.872) 
Profit margin of Target + 1.325 2.098** 
  
(1.052) (0.928) 
Days between announcement and completion ? -0.021*** -0.011 
  (0.008) (0.007) 
Log of deal value ? 0.023 0.158 
  (0.391) (0.387) 
Initial stake (%) + 1.120 5.486* 
  (2.491) (2.968) 
Payment dummy cash -  -1.172 
   (2.313) 
Payment dummy shares +  -5.104** 
   (2.004) 
Cross-country +  -4.667** 
   (1.855) 
Cross-continent +  4.543* 
   (2.562) 
Relative Size - 
 
-0.005* 
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Table 16. Cont. … 
 Variables Hypotheses (1) (2) 
   
(0.003) 
Relative Tobin’s q ? 
 
0.071 
   
(0.068) 
DD[-130; -5; announcement] acquirer ? 
 
-0.281*** 
   
(0.050) 
DD[-130; -5; announcement] target - 
 
-0.039* 














F-statistic  1.52 5.26 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1: The dependent variable is the industry-adjusted change in distance to default of 
the acquiring firm. 
Note 2: DD is the distance to default of the respective firm (a higher value refers to a 
better performing firm). 
Note 3: All variables are either the mean from the period surrounding the announcement 
date, shown by the number of business days in the brackets, or at announcement date. 
 
When deriving the fifth hypothesis we argued that in specific circumstances the 
default risk of the bidder could decrease when the target is riskier, for example, 
when a firm is acquired at a relative low premium due to its current financial and 
business difficulties and when the bidder feels comfortable to succeed in a turn-
around of the target firm. A similar argument might be that a riskier target is very 
low valued and cheaper to acquire and therefore would lead to a smaller shift in 
asset allocation of the acquiring firm. Alternatively, it could be beneficial for the 
acquirer to merge with a riskier target, for example, when the target is smaller and 
the risk profile fits well with that of the acquirer, resulting in pronounced 
diversification effects. Table 16 shows some significant evidence for this hypothesis 
(β=-0.039; p=0.098). Therefore, the fifth hypothesis is supported. When the target 
has a lower distance to default, the default risk of the acquiring firm could decrease. 
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This result is in line with previous research, e.g. by Bruyland and De Maeseneire 
(2016). Another reason for this result could be that the acquiring firm might gain 
more from tax benefits such as a large loss carry forward or high deductible interest 
payments. This can be due to high yield targets being, on average, higher levered 
than investment grade targets, as is presented in Table 9. These are all very special 
cases and examples. However, on average, we observe that the distance to default 
will decrease (the default risk will increase) after the merger, resulting often in 
negative long-run buy–and-hold-abnormal returns. 
From the sixth hypothesis, we expect that there is a positive relationship 
between geographical diversification and change in distance to default, meaning that 
a cross-border merger would decrease the default risk of the acquirer. The results in 
Table 16 indicate that the opposite is more likely (β=-4.667; p=0.012). This suggests 
that cross-border mergers are risk increasing, implying that it might be more 
challenging to assess the target’s risk correctly, or harder to integrate a foreign 
target. It is necessary and important to distinguish between cross-border and cross-
continent deals, due to potentially large cultural differences. Therefore, we also 
hypothesized that cross-continent deals would be more diversifying and risk 
decreasing. In Table 15, we provide a significant indication supporting this part of 
the sixth hypothesis (β=4.543; p=0.012). This might suggest that a cross-continent 
merger is indeed risk diversifying, but could also mean that when a deal is cross-
continental it mitigates the effect of the negative influence of cross-country mergers. 
The seventh hypothesis suggests that if the bidder pays for a deal with cash, he 
is convinced that this deal is profitable and that the merger should most likely 
decrease the default risk. In contrast, mergers are paid with shares of the bidder 
when the deal is much riskier and this should result in a higher default risk as the 
bidder attempts to share the risk with the shareholders of the target, which are 
becoming bidder shareholders. Table 16 reveals that there is a significant negative 
influence of share payment on the distance to default of the acquiring firm (β=-
5.104; p=0.011), thus supporting our hypothesis. This could mean that there is some 
risk transfer when shares are used as a payment method. The bidder and its 
shareholders try to share the risk of a possible difficult and often unsuccessful deal 
with the shareholders of the target. In addition, it can be observed from Table 15 that 
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there is some form of negative and significant relationship between relative size and 
change in distance to default (β=-0.005; p=0.083). This suggests that integrating a 
relatively smaller target should be less of a problem, but merging with a larger target 
is more complicated for the acquiring firm, resulting in a lengthier and more difficult 
process, which would result in a worse post-deal performance and thus an increase 
in default risk. 
Above, we discussed all results on hypothesized relationships on the change in 
default risk. From the overall regression results, another interesting conclusion can 
also be drawn: the coefficient of the distance to default of the acquirer is highly 
significant and negative (β=-0.281; p=0.000). An acquirer with a higher distance to 
default will have a larger decrease in distance to default from the merger or 
acquisition, increasing its default risk and vice versa. Risky acquirers might see a 
decrease in default risk surrounding the merger or acquisition. This can be driven by 
some form of diversification that is only applicable to these acquirers. We also ran 
the same regressions on a different time interval for the distance to default. The 
unpublished results are on average largely the same, but some results in the 
robustness test are less significant and the exploratory power of that model is lower. 
As another robustness test, we compared these regression results to the regression 
results of the Altman Z’’-score. Both of the tests are available upon request. 
The Altman Z’’-score (Altman et al. 2014) for our sample is given by the 
following formula: 
  (7) 
with X1 being (current assets – current liabilities) / total assets, X2 is the retained 
earnings / total assets, X3 is the EBIT / total assets and X4 is the book value of equity 
/ total liabilities. 
 
Table 17. Results for the change in Altman Z’’-score of the acquiring firm 
 Acquirer 





Note: two-sided independent t-test conducted to test whether on average the change in 
Altman Z’’-score is significantly different from 0. 
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The t-test in Table 17 suggests that there is a statistically significant decrease in 
the Altman Z’’-score due to the merger or acquisition, which can also be observed in 
figure 4. This is in line with the results for the distance to default from Table 14, 
which means that our results are rather robust to the model that is used to calculate 
the default risk. 
 
Figure 4. Average Altman Z’’-score of the acquiring firm, over the deal process 
 
Note 1: This graph was constructed after winsorizing at the 1st and 99th percentile 
Note 2: For the construction of this graph, the average of two periods were taken per firm, the 125 days 
leading up to 5 days before the announcement and the 125-day period 5 days after the completion of 
the deal. From these three averages, the average across the sample was calculated. 
 
The regression results in Table 18 suggest overall the same direction of our 
findings as before, however, the significance differs. This could be caused by the 
difference in risk estimation methods between structural models (like the Merton 
model) or accounting-based (Altman Z’’) models. 
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Table 18. OLS regression results for the industry-adjusted change in Altman 
Z’’-score 
 Variables (1) (2) 
  
  
BHAR[-10; +10; announcement] acquirer -0.47700 -0.50024 
 
(0.63287) (0.69576) 
BHAR[-10; +10; announcement] target -0.34996* -0.23883 
 
(0.20920) (0.23096) 
Profit margin of Acquirer -0.42497 -0.02957 
 
(0.65113) (0.69531) 
Profit margin of Target -0.01464 -0.04330 
 
(0.05027) (0.06780) 
Days between announcement and completion -0.00117** -0.00137** 
 (0.00054) (0.00054) 
Log of deal value -0.00671 -0.02804 
 (0.02764) (0.03141) 
Initial stake (%) 0.24710 0.04463 
 (0.15644) (0.16415) 
Payment dummy cash  -0.44313** 
  (0.19616) 
Payment dummy shares  -0.23233 
  (0.16026) 
Cross-country  -0.05262 
  (0.12613) 
Cross-continent  0.06091 





















Constant 0.29562 1.53390** 
 
(0.54425) (0.60019) 
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Table 18. Cont. … 
   
Observations 410 376 
Adjusted R-squared 0.0144 0.1064 
F-statistic 2.26 4.08 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note 1: The dependent variable is the Industry adjusted change in Altman Z’’-score of the acquirer 
Note 2: Z’’ is the Altman Z’’-score of the respective firm (a higher value on this variable means 
better performing firm). 
Note 3: All variables are either the mean from the period surrounding the announcement date, 
which is shown by the number of business days in the brackets, or at announcement date. 






The objective of this study was to examine the influence of a merger or 
acquisition on the default risk of the acquiring firm. Below, we first wrap up the 
results of our study and then continue providing some suggestions for future 
research in this still less studied area. 
 
Wrapping up the study 
While there is an ambiguity in prior studies on distance to default, an apparent 
influence of the distance to default on the buy-and-hold-abnormal return (BHAR) 
can be noticed surrounding the announcement date. To analyse this relationship, an 
adoption of the Merton distance to default model was used to calculate scores for all 
acquiring and target companies. The hypothesized relationships were tested with t-
tests for different subsamples as well as with regression analyses. The data set 
consists of a sample of 531 deals that were completed between the 1
st
 of October 
1998 and the 5
th
 of March 2018, and in which the acquiring or bidder firms were 
from Europe.  
The results from our analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns were compared 
to the results from previous studies. As in most of these studies, our analysis finds 
for the target firms, on average, significantly positive CARs and for the acquiring 
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firms only CARs that are insignificantly different from zero. When analysing the 
buy-and-hold-abnormal returns (BHARs), two observations are important. First, an 
underperformance with the target is visible after the third day subsequent to the 
announcement. It may be that M&A announcements in our sample are first 
overpriced during the announcement period. Therefore, the initial outperformance 
overshoots and is too high, leading to a reversal and a small market performance 
decline later on. The second but important finding of this analysis is the negative 
effect of distance to default of the target on the buy-and-hold-abnormal return of the 
target. Analysing this effect was our main motivation and initiation for this study. 
On average, we observe for our sample that mergers and acquisitions increase 
the default risk of the acquiring firm. This means that some mergers might decrease 
this risk but most often, the default risk is higher after the M&A, which is consistent 
with the poor stock price performance of many deals post M&A. A number of 
explanations and reasons for this observation were already suggested in the literature 
and empirically tested. Firms and managers might be considering alternatives to 
avoid this effect by acquiring only firms that offer great synergies or diversification 
effects, by not overpaying for targets, by having a sound financing of the deal and 
not overextending its own debt capacity, by staying away from mergers among 
equals, and by acquiring defaulting targets only if a turnaround seems very likely.  
We hypothesised that geographical diversification would decrease the default 
risk. However, for our sample, we reject this hypothesis and provide significant 
support for the opposite hypothesis: in cross-country deals the default risk increases, 
on average. However, what does help in diversifying the default risk, is acquiring a 
target that is situated on a different continent. This suggests that a cross-continent 
merger is indeed risk diversifying, but it could also mean that when the deal is cross-
continent it mitigates the negative effect of cross-country mergers.  
The next relationship that we analysed was that mergers that are partially paid 
with shares would increase the default risk. In contrast, when cash was used as a 
payment method, it would decrease default risk. From the overall regression, it 
became evident that share payments increased the default risk and cash payments 
had no significant effect. The hypothesis stating that relative size between the target 
and the acquirer would be negatively related to the change in distance to default was 
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supported. This suggests that relatively larger target firms such as mergers among 
equals are more complicated to integrate into the acquiring firm. 
 
Future research implications 
Our research applies a model that could be employed to predict bidder 
performance subsequent to an M&A deal by analysing a change in default risk of the 
acquiring firm. This result might be of interest to managers of acquiring firms as 
well as corporate finance advisors. Our study also provides some explanations why 
firms still undertake certain deals even though the default risk, on average, 
increases. This study, however, does have some limitations, one of them being 
variables that are needed for the calculation of distance to default were unavailable, 
limiting the sample. Another limitation of the research is that for the calculation of 
the Merton distance to default the time to maturity of all firms’ liabilities was 
assumed to be one year. In real-life, these liabilities have different times to maturity.  
From our data we noticed that for the high-yield acquirers the distance to default 
increases over the deal period. This could have been related to the deal, however, it 
might also be the case that without the deal the distance to default would still have 
increased because it could not decrease further. This is something that is outside of 
the scope of this research and is something for future research to look into, by 
comparing these results with a control sample without mergers and acquisitions. 
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Appendix: Measuring the distance to default (DD) 
 
The moment a firm default on its debt can be assumed to occur on the 
maturity date of the debt, if the face value of the debt is higher than the firm’s 
value (Merton 1974). Shareholders have a residual claim on the assets when 
all debt is repaid in full. This resembles a European call option with a strike 
price equal to the face value of the debt. For the pricing of this European call 
option, the model by Black and Scholes (1973) is used, see equation A1 - A3. 
 ( A1 ) 
with, 
   ( A2 ) 
   ( A3 ) 
with C being the price of the call option, S being the current price of the 
underlying asset, t being the time until expiration, r being the risk-free 
interest rate, X being the strike price of the option, s being the volatility of the 
underlying asset and N being a cumulative standard normal distribution 
(Black and Scholes, 1973). From this, Merton (1974) derived his distance to 
default (DD) model. This model has some assumptions, the first being that 
total firm value follows geometric Brownian motion. This is a continuous-
time stochastic process where the logarithm of the randomly varying quantity 
moves in a Brownian motion (Bharath, Shumway 2008).  
   ( A4 ) 
In equation A4, V is the total firm value, μ is a drift constant represented 
by the return on assets of the firm (ROA),  is the volatility of the firm 
value and dW is a standard Wiener Process (Bharath, Shumway 2008). 
Another important assumption of the Merton DD model is that the firm has 
issued only one discount bond, which matures in time T. These assumptions 
lead to the comparison with a European call option, as described above. From 
these assumptions and the Black and Scholes model, Merton (1974) 
formulates the market value of equity as follows, see equation A5. 
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 ( A5 ) 
In this equation, E is the market value of equity, or the market 
capitalization of the firm, , is given by equation A6, r is the risk-free 
interest rate, F is the face value of debt of the firm, N is a cumulative 
standard normal distribution and  is given by equation A7. 
  ( A6 ) 
   ( A7 ) 
The Merton DD model assumes that equity value is a function of firm 
value and time. It is assumed that equity follows a continuous-time stochastic 
process, which can be described via calculus by Itô’s lemma (Bharath, 
Shumway 2008). From this follows equation A8. 
   ( A8 ) 
From this, several steps are taken in the Merton DD model to arrive at the 
distance to default. First,  must be estimated from option-implied volatility 
or historical stock returns. Second, a forecasting horizon (T) and a measure of 
the face value of debt have to be chosen. A general choice is to estimate  
from historical data, use an assumed time to maturity of the liabilities of 1 
year and use the book value of total liabilities from the balance sheet of the 
firm as proxy for the market value of debt (Bharath, Shumway 2008).  
Third, data should be collected, the methods and sample descriptive 
statistics are explained in the main text. The fourth step is to find V and  by 
iteratively solving equation A5. When these four steps have been undertaken, 
distance to default is given by the following equation, A9. 
  ( A 9 ) 
From the distance to default the probability of default can be obtained by 
using a standard normal cumulative distribution (Bharath, Shumway 2008). 
This is a just an approximation though, since the cumulative distance to 
default will not be normally distributed (Furfine, Rosen 2011). 
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For the analysis, the mean of the 125 days preceding the fifth day before 
the announcement is taken, as well as the mean of the 125 days after the fifth 
day following the completion of the merger or acquisition. These time frames 
are chosen because of the observed and tested run-up period in the market 
surrounding the announcement. A number of robustness tests are conducted 
to check for robustness of this chosen timeframe. These tests are available 
from the authors upon request. They provide overall the same main results.  
From the distance to default mean a difference term (∆DD) is calculated. 
This term is industry adjusted (as ∆IADD) by computing the difference 
between the mean DD change of the industry and the DD change term of the 
firms. This is done to adjust for time and inter-industry effects. The 
calculation is shown in the formulas below. 
    ( A10 ) 
     ( A11 ) 
 
